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575 
Bandimere v. SEC: Significant Authority Exists Without 
Finality 
I. Introduction 
“Liberty requires accountability.”1 
The Framers of the Constitution could not have imagined our sprawling 
administrative system, which “wields vast power and touches almost every 
aspect of daily life.”2 Nor could they have envisioned executive branch 
officials called “administrative law judges” (ALJs) issuing decisions and 
distributing punishment to citizens that violate the law. But they were 
keenly aware of the threat posed by an unaccountable government—that 
“widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic government” 
by preventing citizens from tracing government action to an accountable, 
elected leader.
3
 In fact, the founders noted that when the appointment 
power is dispersed among multiple people, “[s]candalous appointments to 
important offices” are made, making it difficult “to determine by whose 
influence [the people's] interests have been committed to hands so 
unqualified and so manifestly improper.”4 Accordingly, the framers created 
a structural safeguard against unaccountable administration: the 
Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which requires that any officer of 
the United States be appointed by the President, the head of a department, 
or a court of law.
5
  
By “limiting the appointment power” to a specified set of actors known 
to the public, the Appointments Clause guarantees that administrators 
entrusted with significant power are “accountable to political force and the 
will of the people.”6 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) ALJs 
wield far-reaching, coercive powers—they preside over hearings, “rule on 
the admissibility [and credibility] of evidence,” and issue opinions.7 Yet, 
SEC ALJs are protected from direct control by the electorate because they 
are not appointed by the President, the head of the SEC, or a court of law.
8
 
To date, the issue of whether ALJs are officers within the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 2. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). 
 3. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991). 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 6. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884. 
 7. Id. at 868, 881-82.  
 8. 5 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2018). 
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Appointments Clause has sharply divided the federal courts of appeals.
9
 In 
Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. SEC, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that SEC ALJs are not 
subject to Appointments Clause requirements because they are 
“employees,” not “inferior officers,” and can thus be hired through a 
competitive process overseen by the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM).
10
 In contrast, the recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Bandimere v. SEC held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers” 
because they exercise significant discretion, and so they must be appointed 
as dictated by the Appointments Clause.
11
 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling against 
Lucia stands in direct conflict with the Tenth Circuit ruling in Bandimere. 
Both Bandimere and Lucia filed petitions for certiorari.
12
 The Supreme 
Court granted Lucia’s petition because it was a better vehicle to decide the 
issue. Lucia was likely preferable over Bandimere because Justice Gorsuch 
was still a judge on the Tenth Circuit when the SEC asked for a rehearing 
en banc of the Bandimere decision.
13
 
By granting Lucia’s petition for certiorari,14 the Supreme Court indicated 
that ensuring ALJs are constitutionally appointed is now more important 
than ever. Since the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in 2010, there has been a 
dramatic increase in actions brought as administrative proceedings before 
ALJs rather than as civil actions in court.
15
 This increase occurred because 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d 
sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). 
 10. 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 
(2018).  
 11. 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).  
 12. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lucia, 832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130); Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475).  
 13. See Brief for Amici Curiae Raymond J. Lucia in Support of Neither Party at 5-7, 
Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475).  
 14. Lucia v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).  
 15. “Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the SEC historically brought 
approximately 60 percent of its new cases as administrative proceedings. In contrast, over 80 
percent of the new enforcement actions in the first half of fiscal year 2015 were filed as 
administrative proceedings.” Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on 
Administrative Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW 360 (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/2015-Midyear-Checkup-on-SEC-
Administrative-Proceedings; see also SEC Enforcement Activity—First Half FY 2017 
Update, CORNERSTONE RES., https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SEC-
Enforcement-Activity-First-Half-FY-2017-Update (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).  
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the Dodd-Frank Act provided wider discretion in forum selection.
16
 
Because of this recent surge in administrative proceedings, the 
constitutionality of ALJs has become increasingly important. The rise in 
administrative proceedings appropriately carries with it a more prominent 
role in agency policymaking on the part of ALJs.
17
 It also shifts 
responsibility for construing and interpreting the securities laws from 
federal courts to ALJs, because federal courts reviewing administrative 
decisions defer to ALJ decisions.
18
 “Any [individual] with such ample 
policymaking” influence should ultimately “be accountable to the will of 
the people through their elected officials.”19 In light of the increasingly 
central role that SEC ALJs have in adjudicating enforcement actions and 
molding the policy and law governing individuals and businesses, it is 
imperative that the structural safeguards provided by the Appointments 
Clause allow the public to easily identify and hold accountable the officials 
responsible for appointing the ALJs. 
Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth 
Circuit, finding that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers.”20 Critics of the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Bandimere and the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia 
have argued that because SEC ALJs were found to have held their positions 
in violation of the Constitution, then potentially hundreds (if not thousands) 
of prior SEC decisions are in jeopardy of being invalidated.
21
 In addition, as 
Judge McKay pointed out in his Bandimere dissent, a finding that SEC 
ALJs are “inferior officers” could potentially mean that “all federal ALJs 
are at risk of being declared inferior officers.”22 This Note argues that these 
concerns are unwarranted and exaggerated. Even if a ruling that SEC ALJs 
are “inferior officers” would disrupt the administrative system, the “fact 
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 15. 
 17. See Philip J. Griffin, Comment, Developments in SEC Administrative Proceedings: 
An Evaluation of Recent Appointment Clause Challenges, the Rapidly Evolving Judicial 
Landscape, and the SEC's Response to Critics, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 218-19 (2016); 
Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for 
Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1165-66 (2016). 
 18. Griffin, supra note 17, at 218-19; see also Grundfest, supra note 17, at 1166-67. 
 19. Michael A. Carvin, Noel J. Francisco & Christian G. Vergonis, Massive, Unchecked 
Power by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199, 214 (2007). 
 20. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
 21. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1688, 1199-1201 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., 
dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 1199. 
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facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is 
contrary to the Constitution,” for “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”23  
By subjecting citizens to punishment imposed by an ALJ that was not 
appointed by a politically accountable officer, the SEC denies one of the 
“long term, structural protections against abuse of power” that the Framers 
believed “critical to preserving liberty.”24 In addition, by channeling 
enforcement actions to unaccountable ALJs, the SEC brings us closer to a 
“government . . . ruled by functionaries” instead of officers appointed by 
elected leaders accountable to the people.
25
 “It would be a bit much to 
describe the result as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed 
by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”26  
II. Law Before the Case 
A. An Overview of the SEC and Administrative Proceedings 
The SEC is an independent agency with five commissioners, all 
appointed by the President and subject to Senate approval.
27
 To promote 
integrity in the securities markets, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act) established a system of administrative supervision, 
regulation of certain industry practices, and mandatory disclosure 
requirements for companies whose securities were publicly traded on stock 
exchanges.
28
 To execute this program, the Exchange Act created the SEC 
and empowered it to enforce federal securities laws.
29
 The SEC may bring 
enforcement actions in federal court or in an administrative proceeding.
30
 
The SEC derives its power to bring administrative enforcement actions 
from The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which authorizes agencies 
to conduct in-house administrative proceedings before an ALJ.
31
  
An SEC administrative proceeding is an “in-house adjudication,” tried 
before an ALJ, who renders an initial decision.
32
 Either the defendant or the 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
944 (1983)). 
 24. Id. at 730. 
 25. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). 
 26. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012). 
 28. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012). 
 29. See id. § 78d(a). 
 30. See id. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u–1 to –3. 
 31. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).  
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2018). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/8
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SEC can appeal the initial decision to the Commission itself.
33
 An appeal is 
subject to de novo review by the Commissioners who can affirm, reverse, 
modify, or remand the ALJ’s decision.34 If the SEC declines to review or 
fails to review in a timely manner, however, the ALJ's decision becomes 
the final decision of the SEC.
35
 If the SEC issues a decision unfavorable to 
the appellee, that party may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
within sixty days of the date the SEC entered its final order.
36
  
B. The SEC and the Dodd-Frank Act 
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 gave the SEC more power to 
bring significant administrative actions. The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the 
SEC’s ability to use administrative proceedings for enforcement purposes 
by allowing them to initiate cases against non-regulated entities or 
persons.
37
 The Act also provided the SEC “sole discretion” to decide 
whether it should bring the case in an administrative proceeding or in 
federal court.
38
 With this expansion of jurisdiction, ALJs may deliver 
sanctions including cease-and-desist orders, disbarments, and large civil 
penalties that have become powerful offensive weapons adversely affecting 
a much larger group of people.
39
  
After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the use of the administrative 
process for SEC proceedings increased.
40
 Generally speaking, because of 
the significant differences between administrative actions and those filed in 
federal court, there exists a noteworthy “home-court advantage” to the 
administrative arena.
41
 Because discovery is limited, and the proceedings 
move forward swiftly, it can be much more difficult for a responding party 
to develop the facts or mount an affirmative defense.
42
 Additionally, there is 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. § 201.410. 
 34. Id. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452. 
 35. Id. § 201.411. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e). 
 37. Geoffrey F. Aronow, Back to the Future: The Use of Administrative Proceedings for 
Enforcement at the CFTC and SEC, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 1, 
1. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1170 
(2016).  
 40. Lisa Newman, Are SEC Administrative Proceedings the New [Unconstitutional] 
Normal?, 36 REV. LITIG. 193, 201-02 (2017). 
 41. Zaring, supra note 39, at 1175. 
 42. Douglas Davison et al., Litigating with—and at—the SEC, 48 REV. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 103, 108 (2015). 
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no procedure available for a responding party to seek dismissal of the 
allegations at the outset of the case—that opportunity is available only to 
defendants in federal court.
43
 For these reasons, the SEC unsurprisingly 
enjoys a higher rate of success in administrative proceedings than in federal 
court. For example, in the fiscal year ending on September 30, 2014, the 
SEC won 100% of its internal administrative hearings, while winning only 
61% of its trials in federal court.
44
  
C. The SEC ALJs 
An SEC administrative enforcement proceeding is “presided over by one 
of the five SEC ALJs.”45 Currently, the presiding ALJ is technically an 
employee of the SEC.
46
 Nevertheless, the ALJ purportedly acts neutrally 
and impartially when making decisions, even though the SEC is a party to 
the proceeding. To preserve independence between the SEC and the ALJ, 
the APA provides several safeguards.  
First, the ALJs are hired through the Office of Professional Management 
(OPM).
47
 The OPM prequalifies individuals, which means that the ALJ 
applicants who meet the office's qualification standards must pass an 
examination.
48
 The SEC’s Chief ALJ “then select[s] an ALJ from the top 
three” candidates.49 This rigorous selection process represents just one of 
the procedural safeguards designed to promote independence between ALJs 
and the SEC.
50
 Second, ALJs are exempt from the annual performance 
ratings to which other employees are subjected.
51
 OPM regulations also 
provide that “[a]n agency may not rate the job performance of an 
administrative law judge,” or grant “monetary or honorary awards or 
incentives” to ALJs.52 Third, once hired, ALJs receive career appointment, 
meaning they can be fired, suspended, or given a reduction in pay only “for 
good cause established and determined” after a hearing in front of the Merit 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. Newman, supra note 40, at 195.  
 45. Kaela Dahan, Note, The Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Proceedings: The 
SEC Should Cure Its ALJ Appointment Scheme, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2017). 
 46. See Zaring, supra note 39, at 1165. 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2018). 
 48. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204. 
 49. VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/T8YY-EE7F. 
 50. Id. at 7.  
 51. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012). 
 52. 5 C.F.R. § 930.206. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/8
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Systems Protection Board.
53
 Under this removal structure, three layers of 
insulation protect these ALJs from removal by the President.
54
 
D. The Appointments Clause and the Distinction Between “Employees” and 
“Inferior Officers” 
When an ALJ presides over an SEC enforcement action, the ALJ, in 
essence, operates no differently than a federal judge—they must remain 
independent, ethical, and impartial towards the litigating parties.
55
 
Nonetheless, until recently, the prevailing idea was that SEC ALJs are 
“employees” rather than “officers.”56 The current appointment process of 
SEC ALJs is permitted because of this employee designation.
57
 However, 
because the Dodd-Frank Act tremendously enlarged the quasi-judicial role 
of SEC ALJs, now they more closely resemble “inferior officers” than 
employees.
58
 This means that they should be appointed in compliance with 
the Appointments Clause, which provides that:  
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United 
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress 
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments.
59
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
Appointments Clause, noting that it is “among the significant structural 
safeguards of the constitutional scheme. . . designed to preserve political 
accountability relative to important Government assignments.”60 By failing 
to designate SEC ALJs as “officers,” Congress has “mask[ed], under 
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on 
the co-ordinate departments, and thus control[s] the nominal actions (e.g., 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012). 
 54. Zaring, supra note 39, at 1192. 
 55. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt that the 
role of the modern federal . . . ALJ . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”). 
 56. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-11. 
 57. Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).  
 58. Giles D. Beal IV, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: SEC Administrative Law Judges 
Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 423 (2016). 
 59. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 60. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655, 663 (1997).  
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appointments) of the other branches.”61 Thus, by removing the power to 
appoint officers from the President (or department heads or courts of law), 
Congress has commandeered executive power—a danger the Framers 
aimed to prevent.
62
 By removing the power of the executive branch to 
appoint officers, Congress consequently removes the accountability 
safeguards of the executive branch. Citizens must be able to easily identify 
the source of legislation or regulation that impacts their lives to prevent 
Government officials from wielding power without ownership of the 
consequences.
63
 
E. Recent Case Law 
Modern jurisprudence has had difficulty distinguishing “employees” 
from “inferior officers.” The most recent Supreme Court case to address 
this issue is Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
64
 In Freytag, the 
Supreme Court analyzed whether the Tax Court possessed the authority to 
appoint special trial judges (STJs) under the Appointments Clause.
65
 As a 
threshold matter, the Supreme Court determined whether STJs were 
“inferior officers” by focusing on three factors.66 First, the position of the 
STJ was established by law.
67
 Second, “the duties, salary and means of 
appointment” of the STJ were established by statute.68 Third, the STJs 
exercise significant discretion in carrying out important non-ministerial 
functions.
69
 The Freytag Court noted that even though STJs do not have the 
authority to render final decisions, they still exercise significant discretion 
in carrying out important functions such as taking testimony, ruling on 
evidence, conducting trials, and “enforcing compliance with discovery 
orders.”70 Therefore, the Court concluded that STJs were “inferior Officers” 
rather than “employees.”71 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 62. Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, Lucia, 
832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130), 2017 WL 3725916, at *9-10. 
 63. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 64. 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 65. Id. at 872-73. 
 66. Id. at 881. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 881-82. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 882. 
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Despite Freytag’s holding that final decision-making authority was not a 
dispositive element, in Landry v. FDIC, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia emphasized this component in holding that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ALJs were “employees” and not 
“inferior officers.”72 The Landry majority noted that the STJs in Freytag 
had “authority to render the final decision of the Tax Court in declaratory 
judgment proceedings and in certain small-amount tax cases.”73 The court 
contrasted this with the role of FDIC ALJs; noting that although the FDIC 
ALJs can recommend fact-finding determinations, legal conclusions, and 
ultimate decisions, the ALJs cannot make final decisions for the FDIC.
74
 
Therefore, the court concluded that FDIC ALJs were not “inferior 
officers.”75  
Lucia was the first case to address whether the SEC ALJs are 
“employees” or “inferior officers.”76 The D.C. Circuit held that SEC ALJs 
were “employees,” creating a clear circuit split from the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Bandimere.
77
 The court veered away from the three-part test 
formulated in Freytag and invoked a different approach to determine 
whether SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion in carrying out important 
functions.
78
 The court indicated that once an appointee meets the two 
threshold requirements—that the relevant position was established by law 
and the position's duties, salary, and means of appointment are set forth in a 
statute
79—then "the main criteria for drawing the line between inferior 
officers and employees . . . are (1) the significance of the matters resolved 
by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, 
and (3) the finality of those decisions.”80 Following this framework, the 
D.C. Circuit held that because SEC ALJs can only recommend enforcement 
action and do not have the congressional authority to “bind third parties,” 
the third element of this analysis was not satisfied.
81
 Accordingly, a three-
judge panel ruled that SEC ALJs are “employees.”82 Lucia subsequently 
                                                                                                                 
 72. 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 73. Id. at 1133. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1134. 
 76. See Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 284; Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). 
 79. Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284 (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 80. Id. (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
 81. Id. at 286.  
 82. See id. 
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petitioned the D.C. Circuit for en banc review. However, the circuit split 
was preserved after the Lucia court split evenly when reviewing the case en 
banc, effectively affirming its earlier decision.
83
  
The disagreement between the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit reflects 
the conflicting outlooks on what it means to exercise “significant 
authority.” On one hand, according to the D.C. Circuit, SEC ALJs can only 
exercise “significant authority” by rendering a final decision.84 On the other 
hand, according to the Tenth Circuit, “significant authority” can be 
exercised solely by influencing the outcomes of SEC enforcement actions.
85
  
III. Statement of the Case 
In 2012, the SEC brought an administrative action against Colorado 
businessman, David Bandimere, for violating various securities laws.
86
 An 
ALJ conducted a hearing and issued an initial decision that found 
Bandimere liable for securities fraud, barred him from the securities 
industry, ordered him to disgorge the funds he received, and imposed civil 
penalties.
87
 The SEC reviewed the ALJ’s initial decision and issued a 
separate opinion affirming the result.
88
 Bandimere then petitioned the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to review the SEC’s order.89 In his petition, 
Bandimere argued that the SEC process of hiring ALJs was an 
unconstitutional violation of the Appointments Clause, and therefore the 
ALJ had no lawful authority to preside over his case.
90
 Diverging from 
other federal courts, the Tenth Circuit set aside the SEC’s decision, holding 
that the appointment of the ALJ who presided over Bandimere’s hearing 
was not consistent with the requirements of the Appointments Clause.
91
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 83. Lucia v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff’g en banc 832 F.3d 277 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182-84 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 86. Id. at 1171. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1170. 
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IV. Decision 
A. Majority Opinion 
In holding that the SEC’s hiring process for ALJs violated the 
Appointments Clause, the court relied on Freytag and concluded that ALJs 
are “inferior officers” and as such, they must be appointed by the President, 
a court of law, or a department head.
92
 The court expressly rejected the 
Lucia court’s determination that whether an ALJ possesses final decision-
making authority is dispositive for determining inferior officer status, and 
instead focused on Freytag’s three-prong test.93 Applying the Freytag test, 
the court looked to (1) whether the position was established by law; (2) 
whether the duties, salary, and means of appointment are delineated in a 
statute; and (3) the amount of discretion exercised in carrying out important 
functions that are “more than ministerial tasks.”94  
First, the SEC ALJ position was “established by law,” in the APA.95 
Second, SEC ALJs’ duties, salary, and means of appointment are governed 
by statute.
96
 Third, the SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion in carrying 
out “important functions,” including “ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, ruling on dispositive and procedural motions,” taking testimony, 
“issuing subpoenas, and presiding over trial-like hearings,” which “the SEC 
affords ’considerable weight’ during agency review.”97 The court rejected 
the Lucia court’s focus on final decision-making power, holding that while 
“[f]inal decision-making power is relevant in determining whether a public 
servant exercises significant authority . . . that does not mean every inferior 
officer must possess final decision-making power.”98 Finding that “SEC 
ALJs closely resemble the STJs described in Freytag,” the Tenth Circuit 
held SEC ALJs are inferior officers and thus must be appointed in 
accordance with the Appointments Clause.
99
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 1179. 
 93. Id. at 1179-85. 
 94. Id. at 1179, 1181 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991)). 
 95. Id. at 1179 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1179-80 (quoting Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, Securities Act Release 
No. 76308, Exchange Act Release No.33-9972, 2015 WL 6575665, at *15 n.83 (Oct. 29, 
2015)). 
 98. Id. at 1183-84. 
 99. Id. at 1181. 
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B. Concurring Opinion 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Mary Beck Briscoe refuted the dissent’s 
assertion that the majority’s ruling potentially invalidates all ALJs and not 
simply SEC ALJs.
100
 Judge Briscoe argued that even if the majority 
decision potentially invalidated appointment of all current ALJs, the long-
term effects would be minor because courts generally seek “the minimum 
relief necessary to bring administrative overreach in line with the 
Constitution.”101 Judge Briscoe also criticized the dissent's reliance on 
Landry and Lucia, asserting that although “final decision-making power 
might be sufficient to make an employee an officer, that does not mean that 
such authority is necessary” to make an employee an officer.102 Instead, she 
argued that the court should examine all the “duties and functions” that the 
ALJ has been delegated “to determine whether that person is exercising the 
authority of the United States” and is therefore an officer.103 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissent, Judge Monroe McKay pointed out that the consequences 
of the Bandimere decision extended far beyond the SEC and its five ALJs. 
Judge McKay noted that “under the majority’s interpretation of Freytag, all 
federal ALJs are at risk of being declared inferior officers . . . effectively 
render[ing] invalid thousands of administrative actions.”104 In response to 
Judge McKay’s concerns, Judge Briscoe, writing for the concurrence, noted 
that Freytag requires courts to “engage in a case-by-case analysis” of the 
status of government employees, and that the Bandimere decision was 
limited to the SEC’s five ALJs.105  
McKay also argued that “Freytag, which was decided twenty-five years 
ago, should not apply because it has never before been extended by a circuit 
court to any ALJ.”106 McKay asserted that the majority was incorrect in 
concluding that the STJs of the tax court in Freytag were analogous to the 
SEC’s ALJs.107 “[T]he [STJs] at issue in Freytag had the . . . power to bind 
the Government and third parties” while “SEC ALJs do not.”108 He 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 1189 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. at 1190. 
 102. Id. at 1192. 
 103. Id. at 1191. 
 104. Id. at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 1188-89 (Briscoe, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 1194. 
 108. Id. 
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contended that the SEC ALJs lack of “final decision-making authority” 
should be determinative, and “under the Appointments Clause, that 
difference makes all the difference.”109  
D. Petition for Certiorari and ALJ Ratifications 
Following Bandimere, the solicitor general and the SEC filed a short 
petition for certiorari, but noted that Lucia was a better vehicle to decide the 
issue.
110
 When the Lucia petition for certiorari was first filed, many 
confidently predicted it would be granted.
111
 However, the case took a 
surprising turn when the solicitor general filed a brief in support of 
certiorari, abruptly abandoning his defense of the SEC ALJ hiring scheme 
and accepting the petitioner's claim that the SEC's ALJs are in fact “inferior 
officers” subject to the Appointments Clause requirements.112 Seemingly in 
response to these developments, and in an attempt to stave off Supreme 
Court review, the SEC issued an order (“Ratification Order”) ratifying the 
appointment of the SEC’s five ALJs to mitigate any concern that their 
decisions and operations violated the Appointments Clause.
113
 While the 
SEC and the petitioners for certiorari now agree that SEC ALJs are 
“inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court 
was not bound by the solicitor general’s and SEC’s characterization. The 
issue was not moot because the Supreme Court ruling affects dozens of 
other federal agencies that also utilize ALJs.
114
 Additionally, by ratifying 
the ALJ appointments, the SEC may have opened the door to other 
challenges regarding the restrictions on ALJs’ removal because the SEC’s 
ratification process addresses only the hiring, and not the firing, of ALJs.
115
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475). 
 111. Jonathon H. Adler, Is Lucia Still Cert-Worthy?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2018, 
10:33 PM), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/01/02/is-lucia-still-cert-worthy (“When the Lucia 
cert petition was first filed, it seemed like an almost certain grant.”). 
 112. Brief for Respondent at 9-22, Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-
130), 2017 WL 5899983, at *9-22. 
 113. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No. 
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929, 
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 114. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Lucia, 832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130), 2017 WL 
6383147, at *5-6. 
 115. See id. 
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V. Analysis 
A. The Tenth Circuit Correctly Applied the Freytag Analysis 
The Tenth Circuit explained that the D.C. Circuit's decisions in Landry 
and Lucia incorrectly applied Freytag's framework because “[final-
decision-making authority] was not dispositive to Freytag's holding.”116 
The Supreme Court in Lucia also found Freytag determinative.
117
 In 
Freytag, the Court expressly rejected the contention that lack of power to 
make final decisions takes officials outside the Appointments Clause.
118
 
Under Freytag, only duties, authority, and power determine whether 
significant discretion is exhibited; decision-making authority is sufficient, 
but not necessary, to find that an official is an officer.
119
 “Although ALJs 
can be distinguished from STJs in many ways, the principle similarities 
they do share are the ones that consider them inferior officers.”120 SEC 
ALJs have statutory roots and “exercise the same ‘significant discretion’ 
when carrying out the same ‘important functions’ as STJs do,” such as 
taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on evidentiary issues and 
enforcing discovery orders.
121
 Moreover, an ALJ initial decision, unlike 
STJ findings or opinions, can become final without being reviewed by the 
Commission.
122
 Not only do SEC ALJs exercise significant authority, 
making them “inferior officers,” but their current appointment scheme 
deprives the people of any ability to hold the appointed official accountable 
for the consequential actions of the SEC ALJs.  
B. The Concern That Bandimere Will Have a Wide-Sweeping Harmful 
Effect Is Unwarranted and Exaggerated 
1. Holding That ALJs Are “Inferior Officers” Will Not Call into 
Question the Constitutionality of All Prior Decisions Rendered by ALJs 
The SEC issued the Ratification Order ratifying the appointment of the 
SEC’s five ALJs with the intent to “resolve[] any concerns” regarding any 
                                                                                                                 
 116. SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182-85 & n.36 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 117. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018). 
 118. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Thomas C. Rossidis, Article II Complications Surrounding SEC-Employed 
Administrative Law Judges, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 773, 805 (2016).  
 121. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2048 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82). 138 S.Ct. 2044, 
2055 ple, the Social Security Administration,remedy, the actual effect on other agencies is 
less clear. e Appoin 
 122. Id. 
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potential Appointments Clause weakness.
123
 However, whether this order 
actually cures any impending constitutional issues depends on the stage of a 
case in the administrative process. The SEC’s move to ratify the 
appointment of its ALJs has a different effect depending on whether the 
case is closed, pending, or not yet brought.  
The Ratification Order is silent on what is to be done in closed cases and 
cases currently on appeal to a federal court.
124
 These cases have already 
resulted in an initial decision and a Commission order affirming that 
decision; this silence fails to resolve the uncertainty surrounding those 
decisions.
125
 Because SEC ALJs are “inferior officers,” there is uncertainty 
whether parties in closed cases could claim that their constitutional rights 
were violated by improperly-appointed ALJs and subsequently sue for 
damages based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia. This list of 
potential claimants would include those who had previously paid penalties 
or were banned from the industry.
126
 Nonetheless, any ALJ decisions for 
which appeals have been denied or time to appeal has expired would likely 
be considered final and binding decisions.
127
 “Final administrative decisions 
would not be subject to [collateral] attack . . . even when an adjudicator 
lacks the power to decide a case [due to] the presumption in favor of 
finality.”128 The Supreme Court has made this presumption clear by holding 
that even when the judge lacked the authority to preside over a case, the 
defect cannot be attacked collaterally once a judgment has become final.
129
 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Press Release, SEC, SEC Ratifies Appointment of Administrative Law Judges (Nov. 
30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-215. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. There are currently around a dozen cases on appeal from the SEC in the 
federal courts. Lucia v. SEC, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Lucia_v._SEC (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
 126. N. Peter Rasmussen, Messy Clouds and Inferior Officers—The SEC, ALJs and 
Order Maintained, BNA: CORP. TRANSACTIONS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ 
messy-clouds-inferior-b73014472686/. 
 127. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2012). 
 128. Griffin, supra note 17, at 229. 
 129. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 154 (2009) (noting that res 
judicata and practical necessity prevent collateral attacks on jurisdiction on final orders); 
Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC 
Administrative Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement 
Actions (June 22, 2015), http://www.postschell.com/site/files/post__schell__bloomberg_ 
bna__sec_alj_constitutional_questions__6_19_15.pdf (reprint of article from 47 Sec. Reg. & 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1238); Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix to Ward of ALJ 
Constitutional Challenges, REUTERS: BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/ 
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Thus, it is likely that parties with final administrative determinations will be 
unable to successfully attack those rulings collaterally on the grounds that 
the ALJs were appointed unconstitutionally. 
The Ratification Order explicitly addressed cases pending before the ALJ 
or the Commission.
130
 The Order directed that, in all proceedings currently 
pending before an ALJ or the Commission, the same ALJ who conducted 
the proceedings in the first instance must reconsider the entire record, allow 
the parties to submit new evidence, re-examine all prior judicial rulings, 
and issue an order regarding the same.
131
 However, the Lucia Court held 
that a different ALJ must conduct the new proceeding.
132
 More than one 
hundred pending cases must be reconsidered pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s holding.133  
The Ratification Order also addresses the constitutionality of any future 
ALJ decisions.
134
 As long as the judge has been properly appointed, no 
future administrative proceedings before an SEC ALJ will have a claim on 
appeal for vacatur of a decision based on the Appointments Clause.
135
 
However, Lucia argued that the Ratification Order is not a constitutionally 
permissible way to appoint an Officer and “has no effect on any other 
case.”136 The Lucia Court did not address whether additional remedial 
action by the Commission is necessary.
137
 However, the Commission, as the 
head of department, has the power to appoint ALJs and did so by 
ratification.
138
 The Restatement (Third) of Agency specifies that 
“[r]atification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the 
act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority.”139 In 
other words, there must first be an unauthorized act in order for it to be 
                                                                                                                 
alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-
challenges/.  
 130. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No. 
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929, 
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
 133. See Pending Admin. Proceedings, at *3 (listing proceedings remanded to ALJs). 
 134. See id. at *1.  
 135. Press Release, supra note 123; Heidi VonderHeide, SEC Decrees That Its ALJs Are 
Constitutional. Now What?, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=bcfe3890-dee9-41ef-a9b6-2b91fd392203.  
 136. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114 at 8.  
 137. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055. 
 138. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
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ratified and given retroactive effect. However, Lucia also argued that the 
Commission’s lack of involvement in hiring (not appointing) its ALJs 
means there was no prior appointment to be ratified.
140
 In Lucia’s view, the 
Commission cannot ratify an unconstitutional act.
141
  
Lucia’s argument mischaracterizes a cornerstone principle of agency 
law. A principal’s “ratification retroactively creates the effects of actual 
authority,” as long as it manifests its consent to the action being ratified.142 
By stating that it was “ratif[ying] the agency’s prior appointment” of its five 
ALJs, the Commission clearly manifests consent to and approval of the 
prior appointments of its ALJs.
143
 Adopting Lucia’s understanding “would 
turn concepts of agency law on their head by requiring the principal to have 
been involved in the decision to be ratified.”144 The doctrine of ratification 
would be pointless if principals could ratify decisions only where they had 
initial involvement.
145
 The SEC asserts that “it is apparent that the 
Appointments Clause does not bar Congress from limiting the pool of 
prospective appointees from which the Commission may appoint its [ALJs] 
and does not require the Commissioners to play any part in the selection of 
the [ALJs], other than the actual appointing.”146  
2. Holding That SEC ALJs Are “Inferior Officers” Does Not Spell the 
End of Enforcement Actions by ALJs Across the Entire Administrative 
System 
Some are concerned that holding that SEC ALJs are officers could spell 
the end of enforcement actions by ALJs across the entire administrative 
system.
147
 This concern is exaggerated. As an initial matter, agencies can 
avoid this issue by ratifying the appointment of its ALJs. However, if 
ratification is not a constitutionally permissible remedy, the actual effect on 
other agencies is less clear.  
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114, at 8.  
 141. Id. 
 142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 4.01, 4.02. 
 143. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No. 
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929, 
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 144. See Order Denying Motion for Stay, David Pruitt, CPA, Administrative Proceedings 
Rulings Release No. 5603, at 5 n.27 (Feb. 15, 2018). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 7.  
 147. See SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J., 
dissenting). 
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Additionally, many agencies, including, for example, the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”), might not be affected because they are 
distinguishable from the SEC ALJs and the Freytag STJs.
148
 The SSA 
employs 1655 ALJs, which is a vast majority of all the federal ALJs.
149
 
Judge McKay commented in his dissent that he “cannot discern a 
meaningful difference between SEC ALJs and [Social Security 
Administration] ALJs under the majority’s reading of Freytag.”150 The 
dissent’s concern is overblown because whether those ALJs are also 
“inferior officers” turns on the scope of their individual functions and 
discretion.
151
 The Freytag analysis proceeds case-by-case, and this case 
deals only with the duties and qualities of a particular set of five SEC ALJs, 
and not, for example, with the different characteristics of the SSA ALJs 
who make up the bulk of all federal ALJs.
152
 Therefore, the only way the 
Supreme Court could resolve SSA ALJ status is if the Court adopted the 
reasoning in Lucia, focusing solely on final decision-making power.
153
 
However, even under the Freytag analysis the SSA ALJs would likely not 
be considered “inferior officers.”154 
Although SEC ALJs and SSA ALJs might share some of the same 
duties, there are unique distinctions potentially relevant to their analysis 
under the Appointments Clause. For example, SSA ALJs wear the hats of 
both a judge and an agency attorney with the duty of examining witnesses 
and developing the record to ensure that only deserving claimants get 
paid.
155
 They do not conduct adversarial hearings similar to those conducted 
by an SEC ALJ trial determining alleged securities violations.
156
 In Lucia, 
on rehearing en banc, Petitioner’s attorneys argued that finding that the 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2058 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 149. Administrative Law Judges: ALJs by Agency, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-
Agency (last updated March 2017).  
 150. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1200 (McKay, J., dissenting). 
 151. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 19, Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 
15-1345), 2017 WL 947745.  
 152. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1188-89 (Briscoe J., concurring). 
 153. See Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286. 
 154. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991). 
 155. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (“It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the 
facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits . . . .”).  
 156. Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair 
Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals For Improving Social 
Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2003). 
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SEC ALJs were unconstitutionally appointed would not affect the 
thousands of ALJs employed by the SSA because the fact “that those judges 
are engaged in the doling out of government largess rather than executing 
enforcement powers on behalf of the president, makes all the difference.”157  
Even if other agency ALJ appointment schemes violate the Constitution, 
agencies that have amended their ALJ appointment process in the past have 
shown that they are unlikely to experience any significant disruption.
158
 
Although there may be some minor inconvenience because SEC ALJs were 
found to be “inferior officers,” constitutional requirements should not yield 
to convenience and expediency.
159
 “Certainly the possibility of additional 
violations of the Constitution does not justify turning a blind eye to the 
Constitution's requirements.”160  
VI. Conclusion 
SEC ALJs wield incredible power that can impact individuals as well as 
the financial industry as a whole. The considerable increase in power SEC 
ALJs attained post Dodd-Frank, combined with their many quasi-judicial 
duties, indicates that SEC ALJs no longer act as mere “employees.” The 
court’s decision in Bandimere correctly determined that SEC ALJs are 
“inferior officers” and must be appointed in accordance with the 
Appointments Clause. This decision determined that SEC ALJs are officers 
by applying the analysis developed in Freytag, notwithstanding that SEC 
ALJs do not have final decision-making authority.  
Classifying SEC ALJs as officers promotes the purpose of the 
Appointments Clause—to ensure that those who wield appointment power 
are accountable to political force and the will of the American people.
161
 
The concern that holding SEC ALJs are officers will have a far-reaching 
undesirable result is unwarranted. It will not render past decisions invalid 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Oral Argument at 19:30, Lucia v. SEC, on reh’g en banc, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 
2017), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2017.nsf/B5D9C12F894EF5D5 
8525812A005C2AB5/$file/15-1345.mp3. 
 158. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. 110-313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014 
(amending the method of appointing administrative patent and trademark judges to be by the 
Secretary of Commerce); In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *2 (F.T.C. 
Sept. 14, 2015) (noting reappointment of FTC administrative law judge). 
 159. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 944 (1983)). 
 160. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 146, at 19.  
 161. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991). 
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because the presumption in favor of finality prevents them from being 
attacked collaterally. Further, the concern is exaggerated because this 
holding does not spell the end of enforcement actions by ALJs across the 
entire administrative system. The Freytag analysis is employed on a case-
by-case basis, and each set of agency ALJs will be considered individually 
to determine if the judges in question have the level of authority that would 
earn them inferior officer status. The holding causes a slight inconvenience 
to the administrative system, but convenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives of our government. Rather, the protection of liberty is 
chief among our government’s goals. Requiring the appointment of SEC 
ALJs to comport with the Appointments Clause secures the liberty of the 
American people by assuring the appropriate elected official is accountable 
for agency decision-making.  
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